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Strong evidence indicates that non-human primates possess a numerical representation
system, but the inherent nature of that system is still debated. Two cognitive mecha-
nisms have been proposed to account for non-human primate numerical performance: (1)
a discrete object-file system limited to quantities <4, and (2) an analog system which rep-
resents quantities comparatively but is limited by the ratio between two quantities.To test
the underlying nature of non-human primate quantification, we asked eight experiment-
naive olive baboons (Papio anubis) to discriminate between number pairs containing small
(<4), large (>4), or span (small vs. large) numbers of food items presented simultane-
ously or sequentially. The prediction from the object-file hypothesis is that baboons will
only accurately choose the larger quantity in small pairs, but not large or span pairs. Con-
versely, the analog system predicts that baboons will be successful with all numbers, and
that success will be dependent on numerical ratio. We found that baboons successfully
discriminated all pair types at above chance levels. In addition, performance significantly
correlated with the ratio between the numerical values. Although performance was better
for simultaneous trials than sequential trials, evidence favoring analog numerical repre-
sentation emerged from both conditions, and was present even in the first exposure to
number pairs. Together, these data favor the interpretation that a single, coherent analog
representation system underlies spontaneous quantitative abilities in primates.
Keywords: numerosity, primates, baboons, object-file, analog magnitude
INTRODUCTION
From Euclid, who said,“The laws of nature are but the mathemat-
ical thoughts of God,” to the modern mathematical scholar Paul
Dirac who stated, “If there is a God, he’s a great mathematician,”
great thinkers have often associated abstract numerical thought
with the divine. However, in contrast to human intuitions, cog-
nitive science has demonstrated that the seemingly supernatural
human capacity for symbolic mathematical thought – responsi-
ble for scientific measurement, architectural design, and economic
exchange – likely arises from a primitive number representation
system (or perhaps systems) that appear in creatures like beasts and
babies. Evolutionarily and developmentally primitive numerical
systems are well-documented. Non-linguistic infants can reason
about small and large numerosities (for reviews on the extensive
literature, see Feigenson et al., 2004; Cordes and Brannon, 2008), as
can many non-human animals (Primates: e.g., Brannon and Ter-
race, 1998, 2000; Hauser et al., 2000; Beran and Rumbaugh, 2001;
Cantlon and Brannon, 2006, 2007; Other mammals: e.g., Jaakkola
et al., 2005; Ward and Smuts, 2007; Uller and Lewis, 2009; Birds:
e.g., Pepperberg, 2006; Rugani et al., 2007, 2008, 2010; Amphib-
ians: e.g., Uller et al., 2003; Fish: e.g., Agrillo et al., 2007). However,
the precise nature of the representations underlying infant vs. ani-
mal quantity judgments has been a subject of discussion in the
numerical cognition literature.
Non-linguistic numerical cognition in human infants is
hypothesized to involve two different mechanisms: a precise
object-file system and an analog magnitude system. The object-
file system is thought to be an aspect of working memory, which
individuates, enumerates, and tracks objects, and so, is inherently
capable of tracking the number of objects (Trick and Pylyshyn,
1993, 1994). As working memory is limited to tracking three or
four objects, the signature of the object-file system as a number
representation system is the failure of an individual to discrimi-
nate between two quantities if at least one of those quantities is
larger than three (or four). The analog system also has a set of sig-
natures that can be used to detect its functioning (Dehaene, 1997).
Unlike the object-file system, the analog system is (in principle)
capable of representing any number. Instead of bearing a capacity
limit, the analog system is limited by the ratio of two compared
quantities, with crude ratios being more distinguishable than fine
ratios. For example, two numbers that have a crude ratio, such as
1 and 4 (0.25 ratio) will be easily discriminated, while two num-
bers with a fine ratio, such as 3 and 4 (0.75 ratio), may not be
discriminated. The magnitudes are psychologically spaced either
logarithmically or linearly with scalar variability, and because of
this, the numerical ratio (and not the absolute numerical value)
is the critical variable that determines whether two quantities can
be discriminated in the analog system (e.g., Gallistel and Gelman,
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1992; Cantlon et al., 2009). The proportion difference in quan-
tity needed to successfully discriminate between two quantities is
called the Weber fraction. In summary, the analog system is lim-
ited by ratio but provides a larger range of numerical values that
can be represented whereas the object-file system is precise, but
limited to representing only very small quantities.
The existences of the object-file system and the analog system
are not controversial. The role of the object-file system in tracking
objects is well established. The relevant research questions are if,
when, and how the object-file system is spontaneously recruited
to represent quantity. Infants appear to use both an analog and an
object-file system to compare quantities spontaneously. With small
numbers of objects (<4), infants are capable of making correct
numerical judgments no matter the ratio between sets (Feigenson
et al., 2002; Feigenson and Carey, 2003). In contrast, when infants
judge larger sets, accurate discrimination is a function of ratio
(Xu and Spelke, 2000; Xu, 2003; Lipton and Spelke, 2004; Xu and
Arriaga, 2007). Most importantly, studies have found that when
infants and toddlers are required to compare a small vs. large set on
a given trial, their performance is random (Feigenson and Carey,
2005; Le Corre and Carey, 2007; but see Cordes and Brannon,
2009; Cantlon et al., 2010). Researchers argue that the compari-
son of a small and large value cannot be completed because each
numerical system handles just one type of number (small or large)
and the two systems do not communicate (Feigenson et al., 2002;
Feigenson and Carey, 2003). The finding of failures of infants to
compare small and large numbers is taken as further evidence of
the presence of two distinct numerical systems.
The pattern of success and failure observed in infants is not
observed in adults. When adults are asked to judge quantities while
their verbal abilities are occupied by an articulatory suppression
task, their number discrimination behavior exhibits the ratio sig-
nature of the analog system for small and large numbers alike
(Whalen et al., 1999; Cordes et al., 2001; Barth et al., 2003; Beran
et al., 2006). Adults can successfully discriminate small (<4) from
large (>3) sets in the same comparison, unlike infants. Likely, the
analog system is the primary non-linguistic number representa-
tion system in adults, although the object-file mechanism might
be recruited for quantitative judgments under limited conditions
(Trick and Pylyshyn, 1993, 1994). Current evidence suggests that
the adult pattern of predominantly analog numerical representa-
tion emerges by at least 3 or 4 years of age (Halberda and Feigenson,
2008; Cantlon et al., 2010).
The data from human infants and adults raise the question
of whether the “two systems” view of quantity development also
characterized the evolution of numerical cognition. Compara-
tive studies of numerical cognition with non-human animals
have yielded mixed results on the fundamental nature of num-
ber cognition in non-humans. In one study, Hauser et al. (2000)
presented experiment-naive rhesus macaques with differing quan-
tities of apple slices dropped sequentially into two boxes. The
macaques chose the box with the larger amount in 1 vs. 2, 2
vs. 3, 3 vs. 4, and 3 vs. 5 contrasts, but failed with larger num-
bers such as 4 vs. 5 and span contrasts such as 3 vs. 8. Given
these data, these researchers concluded that only the object-file
system is spontaneously available to rhesus macaques, a posi-
tion that was supported by subsequent testing with the same
population (Hauser and Carey, 2003; Barner et al., 2008; Wood
et al., 2008). However, the majority of other non-human number
studies have not upheld these results. For instance, Beran (2007)
found evidence of the analog system in rhesus macaques with a
joystick task that was highly similar to Hauser’s design. Subjects
watched as an image of a hand appeared to drop between 1 and 10
blocks into two boxes onscreen. Macaques succeeded at choosing
the box with the larger quantity of blocks at above chance levels
with both small and large set sizes, with success on each contrast
being a function of numerical ratio. In critical test trials, Beran’s
macaques also succeeded when contrasts involved one small set
(<4) and one large set (>4), suggesting that a single-system, the
analog system, was responsible for all number representation in
those macaques. Other numerical studies have also supported the
analog magnitude hypothesis in multiple primate species (Bran-
non and Terrace, 1998, 2000; Beran and Rumbaugh, 2001; Smith
et al., 2003; Beran and Beran, 2004; Judge et al., 2005; Brannon
et al., 2006; Cantlon and Brannon, 2006, 2007) using a variety of
testing paradigms. Those data also implicate the analog magni-
tude system as the core mechanism of number representation in
primates.
Growing evidence suggests that the analog magnitude system
is the evolutionarily primitive number system shared across ani-
mal lineages. Less clear is whether the analog magnitude system is
the primary mechanism that non-human animals recruit sponta-
neously to solve quantity problems. There is already some evidence
that apes spontaneously show ratio effects in their numerical per-
formance (Beran, 2001, 2004; Beran and Beran, 2004; Hanus and
Call, 2007). Although those studies did not compare the animals’
performance on small vs. large values during first exposures, the
rapid emergence of ratio effects in performance supports the ana-
log magnitude hypothesis. Currently, most studies concluding that
primates primarily rely on the analog magnitude system have been
conducted with subjects that have long histories of exposure to
experimental methods (e.g., Brannon and Terrace, 1998; Smith
et al., 2003; Cantlon and Brannon, 2006, 2007; Beran, 2007; Beran
et al., 2008). It is sometimes argued that such exposure could
influence the strategies that subjects recruit to solve problems. For
example, Hauser et al. (2000) argued that experiments that involve
extensive training could allow animals to acquire the cognitive
abilities necessary for solving numerical tasks. In the Beran (2007)
study described above, the subjects had participated in several pre-
vious numerical cognition studies where they received thousands
of trials of experience with numerical discriminations. Thus, there
remains the possibility that the training period associated with the
laboratory experiments caused the discrepancy in results between
the laboratory experiments (e.g., Beran, 2007) and the naturalistic
experiments (Hauser et al., 2000).
In the current study, we tested quantity discrimination in
experiment-naive olive baboons using a naturalistic food choice
task that is similar to the Hauser et al. (2000) and Beran (2007)
designs but without the extensive training regimen of Beran
(2007). In the current experiment, baboons were presented with
two sets of one to eight peanuts placed simultaneously or sequen-
tially into two of three cups, and were rewarded with the contents
of the cup they chose. The baboon subjects were experiment-naive,
having never participated in psychological experiments. Together,
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these design elements allowed us to test for the spontaneous
quantitative representations that baboons use naturally, during
food choices.
In Experiment 1, we examined the spontaneous quantity rep-
resentations of eight olive baboons by analyzing their quantity
choices on first exposure to each number pair. Subjects compared
numerical values in pairs of both small (<5), both large (>4), and
span sets (one small and one large value). This range of sets allowed
us to test the object-file and analog magnitude hypotheses. If the
baboons are successful only with contrasts of small sets, then the
object-file hypothesis will be supported. If the baboons are suc-
cessful with small and large, but not span sets, we can conclude
that both the object-file and the analog magnitude systems are
engaged by baboons, as in human infants, but that the object-file
and analog magnitude representations are incompatible resulting
in failure on span sets. Finally, prior research with infants found
that infants succeeded at discriminating large and span pairs in
simultaneous but not sequential presentations (Feigenson et al.,
2002). The argument is that the object-file mechanism is selec-
tively recruited during sequential presentations due to its primary
function as an object tracking system. Evidence for object-file-
based quantity judgments in monkeys would thus include failures
on both large and span pairs only for sequential presentations.
However, if we find that our subjects can accurately make choices
no matter the set size, and that accuracy on a particular numerical
pairing is explained by numerical ratio, then we will have evidence
that the analog magnitude system is the dominant mechanism
for number representation in baboons, similar to human adults.
In addition to testing these hypotheses, we were also interested
in the effects of experience on primate number representation.
In Experiment 2, we extended the testing of two baboons that
participated in Experiment 1 for additional sessions, and analyzed
changes in their sensitivity to numerical discriminations over time.
The results we report aim to further our understanding of the





Eight adult olive baboons (4–14 years old, three male) at the Seneca
Park Zoo in Rochester, NY, USA served as subjects in this experi-
ment. These baboons are housed as a social group and have access
to large indoor and outdoor enclosures. In addition, these enclo-
sures have multiple compartments that allow us to temporarily
segregate one baboon from the rest of the troop for testing pur-
poses. Primate chow and fresh fruits and vegetables are provided
every morning, and water is available ad libitum. Prior to these
experiments, subjects had no experience with cognitive testing.
The first experimental experience of these baboons was during
the preparation phase of this experiment which trained subjects
to choose the cup containing occluded food vs. two empty cups.
In the preparation phase task, baboons were trained to use the
apparatus by tracking a 1/2-grape hidden below one of three
metal compote cups, and were rewarded for touching the port
corresponding to the hidden food. Subjects required less than
one session to choose the baited cup. Immediately following the
preparation phase, the baboons were tested with the numerical
food choice discriminations described below. Work with these
subjects was approved by the Institutional Animal Care and Use
Committee of the University of Rochester.
Apparatus
The apparatus consisted of a small and short rectangular table
(75 cm long× 35 cm deep× 17 cm high) that was a comfortable
height for a seated baboon (Figure 1). One long side of the table
top was open so that an experimenter could work the apparatus,
but the other three sides were shielded by plexiglass (30 cm high)
to prevent baboons from interacting with the apparatus until the
appropriate time. When in use, the long side of plexiglass was
pushed flush with the mesh of an enclosure, a subject sat behind
the plexiglass (and the mesh of the enclosure), and an experi-
menter sat opposite the subject. There were three equally spaced
ports (2.5 cm diameter) in the plexiglass that subjects could use to
indicate their choices.
All experimental manipulations were conducted on a sliding
panel (75 cm long× 17 cm deep) that sat atop the table. The pur-
pose of this panel, which was the same length as the table, but
only half as deep, was to control a subject’s access to the experi-
ment until the appropriate time. When the panel was close to the
experimenter, the subject did not have access to the experimental
items, however, when the panel was pushed forward, toward the
subject, the subject could reach through a port in the plexiglass and
indicate her choice. The contents of the panel were three identical,
opaque, cardstock cylinders, placed upright on a circular end, each
in front of one of the ports in the plexiglass shield. The cylinders
were open on both circular ends so that the experimenter could
drop items into a cylinder and also lift a cylinder up, leaving the
contents of a cylinder on the panel. Once items were dropped into
the cylinders the items were hidden from a subject. The items to
be enumerated were unshelled half peanuts.
PROCEDURE AND DESIGN
General procedure
Each session was conducted by two experimenters. One exper-
imenter worked the apparatus, while a second experimenter
recorded the choices made by the subject, monitored the first
experimenter for trial accuracy, and also operated a video camera
which was used to record each session. Sessions were conducted
when a subject could be temporarily isolated from the troop in an
enclosure. Individuals were tested between one and three times a
week.
Before testing began, the experimenters set up the apparatus:
the plexiglass side of the table was placed flush with the subject’s
enclosure, the sliding panel was placed on the experimenter’s side
of the table, the three cylinders were set in place on the panel, and
one experimenter sat opposite the subject. A trial could only be
initiated if the subject was seated at and attentive to the appara-
tus. To initiate a trial, an experimenter showed the subject one or
more peanuts; this was done by displaying peanuts in the palms
of one or both hands, about 30 cm from the subject and above the
experimental panel (Figure 1A). Half of all trials were simultane-
ous condition trials, in which the two number sets to be compared
were presented simultaneously, one in each hand. For example,
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FIGURE 1 |The apparatus for Experiments 1 and 2. The apparatus
consisted of a short and small table, open on one side to the experimenter,
and shielded by plexiglass on the subject’s side. The table was pushed flush
with the subject’s enclosure for use. (A) To initiate a trial, the experimenter
showed a subject a quantity of reward in her hand(s) (simultaneous condition
shown). (B) The reward(s) were placed into opaque cylinders. (C) The panel
was pushed forward and the subject indicated his choice by pointing to a
cylinder. (D) The subject received the reward he selected.
if the subject was to be tested on the contrast 3 vs. 6 items, the
experimenter would have three peanuts in the palm of one hand
and six peanuts in the palm of the other hand. The experimenter
showed these options to the subject for approximately 2 s, after
which the experimenter simultaneously placed the contents of
each hand into its own cylinder (Figure 1B). In doing so, the
experimenter touched both cylinders in the same way and for an
equal amount of time. The entire process of peanut selection, pre-
sentation, and placing it in a cylinder took approximately 4 s. The
remaining trials were the sequential condition trials, in which only
one peanut was presented at a time. Each peanut was presented
to the subject for approximately 2 s and then placed into a cylin-
der. For example, if the experimenter was testing the numerical
pair 3 vs. 6, the first three peanuts presented were baited into one
cylinder one-at-a-time, and the following six peanuts were then
baited into a second cylinder one-at-a-time. Again, the experi-
menter was careful to touch the cylinders in the same way and
for the same amount of time. To ensure that subjects were not
basing their choices on the spatial location of the sets, the larger
and smaller numerical values were equally likely to appear in any
one of the three cylinders across the session. Note, that although
there were always three cylinders on the board, only two of these
cylinders were baited with food on each trial. The presence of
the third cylinder allowed us to monitor subjects’ understanding
of the general task requirement that only baited cups should be
chosen. Subjects almost never selected the empty cylinder (4%
of sequential and 3% of simultaneous trials) indicating that they
understood the task.
After the cylinders had been baited with peanuts, the panel was
pushed forward and the subject was allowed to make a choice
from among the three cylinders (Figure 1C). Experimenters did
not look at the cups after baiting until after the subject indicated
their choice. The subject indicated its choice by poking its fin-
ger through the port in front of the desired cylinder. Then, the
experimenter removed the cylinder from over the desired food,
and the food reward was fed, one peanut at a time, to the subject
through the same port (Figure 1D). In the case that there was no
food reward under the chosen cylinder, the subject received no
reward. When the subject had received the entirety of its reward,
the experimenter removed the other two cylinders from the panel,
revealing their contents. The experimenter removed the reward
not chosen. Once all peanuts were removed from the board, the
experimenter pulled the panel back to her side of the apparatus,
and reset the board. The next trial was initiated. This procedure
was used throughout the training and testing phases.
Training
In the training phase,we exposed the subjects only to the numerical
comparison 1 vs. 2, presented both simultaneously and sequen-
tially. Subjects were given multiple sessions until they chose the
larger reward set at above chance levels within a single session as
determined by a cumulative binomial analysis (threshold= 24/36
correct). Each session consisted of 36 trials; these trials were
counterbalanced for baiting locations, simultaneous vs. sequential
conditions, and in the case of sequential trials, for which number
set was baited first. Progress through the session was closely mon-
itored. If a gap of 5 min occurred between two trials due to subject
inattention, the session was terminated, and training resumed the
next time the subject was available. Terminated sessions were rare
and excluded from analyses. Once the subject passed the training
criterion they immediately began the testing phase of the experi-
ment. Subjects needed 1.5 sessions on average (54 trials) to reach
our criterion.
Testing
Testing was conducted over 54 total test trials, across two 30-min
sessions. The 27 different number pairs ranging from 1 to 8 items
were tested (all possible pairs excluding 1 vs. 2 which was the train-
ing pair), with each number pair tested once in sequential and
once in simultaneous presentation. The beginning of each testing
session consisted of a warm-up of four 1 vs. 2 trials (two simul-
taneous, two sequential) to ensure the subject was oriented to the
task. Two additional trials of 1 vs. 2 (one sequential, one simultane-
ous) were tested in each session but those trials were not analyzed
as 1 vs. 2 was the training and warm-up pair. If the subject failed
more than half of these first trials, testing with that subject was
terminated for the day. The order of the test trials was randomized
within and between subjects. Also, as in training, baiting locations,
simultaneous vs. sequential conditions, and in the case of sequen-
tial trials, which baited first, were randomized. In addition, pair
size, presentation type, and location of the larger quantity were
never repeated on more than three consecutive trials. If a gap of
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5 min occurred between two trials due to subject inattention, the
session was stopped, and the remaining trials were resumed after
a warm-up during the next testing day.
Data analysis
Data were coded and analyzed by an independent observer who
coded responses from the recorded video files. Weber fractions




Subjects took an average of 1.5 sessions to reach the training crite-
rion of above-chance performance within a single session on 1 vs. 2
numerical comparisons according to a binomial test (range= 1–2
sessions).
Testing
Seven monkeys completed all 54 trials of testing, the eighth
completed 21 of 27 sequential trials and 22 of 27 simultaneous
trials. As a group, monkeys preferentially selected the larger quan-
tity on the first exposure for simultaneous pairs [chance= 50%,
one sample t (7)= 2.76, p< 0.05] and for sequential pairs [one
sample t (7)= 4.38, p< 0.01]. Figure 2 shows the overall per-
formance on simultaneous and sequential trials. Simultaneous
performance was marginally higher than sequential performance
across the group but the difference was not significant [t (7)= 1.74,
p= 0.12]. Figure 3 shows performance on the three pair types
tested: small, large, and span pairs. Monkeys performed signifi-
cantly above chance on small number pairs [t (7)= 3.21, p< 0.05]
and span pairs [t (7)= 2.99, p< 0.05] but large pair performance
was non-significant [t (7)= 1.44, p= 0.19]. Poor performance on
large numbers could be explained by the fact that large number
pairs have inherently more difficult discrimination ratios. Further
analyses revealed that on the sequential trials, particularly for large
numbers, monkeys had a bias to select the more recently presented
FIGURE 2 | Average accuracy for eight monkeys on sequential and
simultaneous trials from their first exposure to numerical
discriminations. Chance is a 0.5 probability. Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean across monkeys.
FIGURE 3 | Average accuracy for eight monkeys on the small (both
numbers <5), large (both numbers >4), and span pairs (one number
<5 and one number >4) on their first exposure to numerical
discrimination. Chance is a 0.5 probability. Error bars represent the
standard error of the mean across monkeys.
food set [t (7)= 5.17, p< 0.01]. This bias on large sequential tri-
als cannot explain successful performance on the other pair types
because the larger number was equally likely to be presented first
or second on sequential trials and on simultaneous trials both sets
were presented at the same time. Instead, performance across all
number pairs was predicted by numerical ratio.
We binned the numerical pairs by their numerical ratio and
tested for a linear trend of numerical ratio. Monkeys showed a
significant effect of ratio on their simultaneous trial performance
indicating that they made choices on the basis of an analog quan-
tity representation [Pearson’s r(19)=−0.38, p< 0.05]. This find-
ing suggests that monkeys struggled to discriminate large values
in part due to their more difficult discrimination ratios. Figure 4
shows the effect of ratio on monkeys’ quantity discrimination in
this first exposure task. Performance on numerical pairs ranges
from approximately 75% on easy ratios to 55% on difficult ratios.
We calculated individual Weber fractions for the five animals
that performed above chance overall on the first exposure task.
Weber fractions on first exposure ranged from 0.51 to 0.91, which
is comparable to the range of Weber fractions exhibited by young




Subjects for Experiment 2 were two female baboons who partici-
pated in Experiment 1 (Pearl, Ursala).
Apparatus, procedure, design, and data analysis
In Experiment 2 we collected more data on numerical comparisons
from two subjects in order to detect subtle performance signatures
among pair types. We used the same apparatus and procedure as in
Experiment 1. Three cups were presented on each trial as choices,
two of the cups were baited. In this experiment, monkeys never
chose the empty cup. The numerical values presented ranged from
1 to 8. Each session began with a five-trial 1 vs. 2 “warm-up.” The
test immediately followed the warm-up and contained approxi-
mately eight of each small, large, and span test pairs (four each
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FIGURE 4 | Effect of numerical ratio on monkeys’ accuracy during their
first exposure to numerical discrimination. The numerical ratio is the
smaller number in a given pair divided by the larger number. Each data point
represents a different number pair. The trend line represents a linear trend
of decreasing accuracy with finer numerical ratios.
of simultaneous and sequential) and four 1 vs. 2 trials randomly
interspersed throughout the test trials. Sessions were equated for
mean numerical ratio across conditions. The numerical ratio was
an average of approximately 0.5 for each pair type in each ses-
sion. This meant that some pair types were tested more frequently
than others. We tested the Experiment 2 subjects until they had
multiple exposures to all contrasts in both presentation types. We
completed 11 sessions with Pearl and 13 sessions with Ursala, as
described in the procedure for Experiment 1. Extra sessions were
required due to incomplete trials during some sessions. Ultimately,
each animal completed approximately 130 trials per presentation
format. There was a total average of approximately 4.5 trials per
number pair, per presentation format.
It is important to note that the animals were not trained to
select the larger quantity over the course of time. Instead, animals
were always rewarded with the cache that they chose. The only
way that a longer exposure period could possibly result in learning
over time is if the animals are able to discriminate the quantities
of the choices they were given. That is, because the animal was
rewarded with their chosen food quantity on each trial, in order to
learn that the quantity they chose was either greater or lesser than
the alternative quantity, they would have to be able to discriminate
and compare the quantities of the chosen vs. unchosen rewards.
RESULTS
In this longer exposure task, both monkeys significantly chose
the larger food set for both sequential trials [binomial tests,
Pearl (83/120 trials), p< 0.001, Ursala (91/141 trials), p< 0.001]
and simultaneous trials [Pearl (96/121 trials), p< 0.001, Ursala
(114/141 trials), p< 0.001]. These data indicate that animals can
spontaneously discriminate quantities presented simultaneously
and sequentially. Additionally, these monkeys were successful
at choosing the larger quantity for small pairs [binomial test,
Pearl (62/80 trials), p< 0.001, Ursala (63/85 trials), p< 0.001],
span pairs [Pearl (64/80 trials), p< 0.001, Ursala (85/102 tri-
als), p< 0.001], and large pairs [Pearl (53/81 trials), p< 0.01,
Ursala (57/95 trials), p< 0.05]. This above-chance performance
for small, span, and large quantity pairs supports the conclusion
that olive baboons spontaneously use the analog numerical system
to solve this task. The only exception is that for large sequen-
tially presented pairs monkeys displayed a bias in selecting the
most recently presented set [binomial test on choosing the second
cache,Pearl (27/40 trials),p< 0.05,Ursala (43/45 trials),p< 0.001;
all p’s for other five pair types >0.05]. However, since monkeys’
performance was significantly above chance on sequentially pre-
sented span pairs, there is still evidence that spontaneous analog
quantity representations were used to solve the sequential task
[Sequential span pairs: Pearl (29/40 trials), p< 0.01, Ursala (39/52
trials), p< 0.001]. In addition, both monkeys showed a ratio
effect across both the simultaneous and sequential trials, impli-
cating the analog numerical system [Simultaneous pairs: Pearl:
r(19)=−0.43, p< 0.05; Ursala: r(19)=−0.59, p< 0.01; Sequen-
tial pairs: Pearl: r(19)=−0.66, p< 0.001; Ursala: r(19)=−0.36,
p= 0.05]. Figure 5 shows performance for each monkey, for each
pair type as a function of numerical ratio. Each data point on
Figure 5 represents a different numerical pair. The individual
Weber fractions for both monkeys over longer exposure were 0.44.
This fraction is slightly better than Pearl’s Weber fraction on the
first exposure task (0.57) and comparable to Ursala’s (0.39).
Comparison of monkey performance to predictions from the
object-file hypothesis
As discussed in the Introduction, failure on numerical pairs with
one value greater than three has been taken as evidence for object-
file representation in the literature on infant quantity development
(Feigenson et al., 2002). In order to test whether monkeys exhibit
the same patterns of performance as human infants, we tested
monkeys’ performance on specific pairs that human infants have
been shown to fail at in previous studies. Here, we examined
the data from Experiment 1 (first exposure) and Experiment 2
(longer exposure). We tested the numerical pairs 2 vs. 4, 3 vs. 4,
and 3 vs. 6, which human infants fail to discriminate. We also
tested monkeys’ performance on numerical pairs that were pre-
viously argued to elicit discrimination failures in monkeys, and
were argued to provide evidence of object-file quantity repre-
sentation in non-human primates (Hauser et al., 2000). Figure 6
shows monkeys’ performance on all numerical pairs which mon-
keys would be predicted to fail to discriminate under an object-file
hypothesis: 2 vs. 4, 3 vs. 4, 3 vs. 6, 3 vs. 8, 4 vs. 5, 4 vs. 6, 4 vs.
8. Again, all of these pairs have been reported as failures in mon-
keys, infants, or both and those failures have been cited in support
of the object-file hypothesis (Hauser et al., 2000; Feigenson et al.,
2002). In contrast to prior infant and some non-human primate
findings, monkeys performed significantly above chance on these
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FIGURE 5 | Effect of numerical ratio on accuracy from the two monkeys (Pearl and Ursala) tested in the longer exposure (Experiment 2) for sequential
(filled circles) and simultaneous trials (open circles). Trend lines represent linear trends of decreasing accuracy with finer numerical ratios.
FIGURE 6 | Monkeys’ accuracy on numerical pairs which have been
previously reported to elicit failures under the object-file system. In
contrast to the predictions of the object-file model, monkeys performed
significantly above chance across these pairs on their first exposure to
numerical discrimination (left panel, data from Experiment 1) and on longer
exposure to the numerical task (right panel, data from Experiment 2) for both
the sequential and simultaneous conditions. Error bars represent standard
error of the mean across monkeys. Chance is a 0.5 probability.
pairs, even on their first exposure in Experiment 1 [First Expo-
sure Group: one sample t -test vs. chance, t (7)= 2.99, p< 0.05;
Longer Exposure Group: Binomial Tests vs. chance, Sequential:
Pearl (18/27, p= 0.06), Ursala (23/32, p< 0.01], Simultaneous:
Pearl (22/27, p< 0.001), Ursala (25/32, p< 0.01). Moreover, seven
out of eight monkeys in Experiment 1 performed above 50%
on these critical test pairs on the first trial (Binomial test 7/8,
p< 0.05). Instead of failing to discriminate pairs in which one
quantity exceeded the object-file capacity limit of three or four,
performance on these pairs was modulated by ratio for both
the simultaneous and sequential presentations implicating ana-
log magnitude representations of number (Figure 7). The pres-
ence of a ratio effect on these critical test pairs indicates that
analog magnitude representations were used to compare these
quantities.
Finally, in order to confirm that the animals were not learn-
ing these “predicted fail pairs” over time, we tested for trends
of improving accuracy across the longer exposure period for the
predicted fail pairs. Neither monkey showed a significant improve-
ment in accuracy as a function of time for these pairs [Pearl
r(11)= 0.31, p= 0.35; Ursala r(13)=−0.04, p= 0.90].
Control condition
In Experiments 1 and 2 there is a possibility that animals used sub-
conscious cues from the human experimenters to solve the task.
This possibility seems unlikely for several reasons. First, we found
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FIGURE 7 | Performance on the critical test pairs for object-file
representation: 2 vs. 4, 3 vs.4, 3 vs. 6, 3 vs. 8, 4 vs. 5, 4 vs. 6, 4 vs. 8. All
of these pairs have been reported as failures in monkeys, infants, or both
and those failures have been cited in support of the object-file hypothesis
(Hauser et al., 2000; Feigenson et al., 2002). Each data point on the graph
represents a different numerical pair from this set. Trend lines represent
linearly decreasing accuracy as numerical ratio gets finer. Contrary to the
predictions of the object-file hypothesis, accuracy on these numerical pairs
is modulated by numerical ratio in monkeys.
evidence that the animals selected the larger quantity on their first
exposure to the task and did not learn the task by trial-and-error,
contrary to accounts of human cueing which are hypothesized to
require associative learning over the course of training (i.e., Clever
Hans; see Beran, 2012). Secondly, as mentioned earlier, in order
for these animals to engage in associative learning during our food
choice task they would have to be able to discriminate the quan-
tity of the reward they received from the quantity that they did
not receive. This is because the animals are rewarded on every
trial with some quantity of food: either the larger or the smaller
amount. If the animals have the spontaneous quantitative abilities
to discriminate the reward they received from the one they didn’t,
then they would likely use those spontaneous quantitative abilities
to choose the larger number of food items rather than using their
quantitative abilities to arduously form associations between the
relatively larger quantity and human cues. Third, the monkeys’
performance was modulated by ratio whereas the human experi-
menters knew precisely the quantity of food items in each cup and
thus would have subconsciously cued precise performance by the
baboons. In short, it seems unlikely that human cueing played a
role in the animals’ quantity decisions. Unfortunately the litera-
ture on primates’ abilities to use subtle human body language cues
is sparse and so, it is unclear what behavioral patterns we should
expect to see if the animals in our experiments used subconscious
human cues to guide their choices. The main source of data on this
issue is the Clever Hans phenomenon, a horse who (it is claimed)
used the tension in the body language of his trainer to accurately
respond to mathematical tasks. Currently, there are no rigorous
experimental data that show whether, when, or how non-human
primates are able to use such cues spontaneously or otherwise to
guide decisions. And so, in order to rule out the possibility that
our animals used subconscious cues from human experimenters
to guide their food choices, we conducted a controlled test.
METHODS AND MATERIALS
SUBJECTS
Subjects were the two female baboons who participated in
Experiment 2 (Pearl, Ursala).
APPARATUS, PROCEDURE, DESIGN, AND DATA ANALYSIS
In the control condition, the two animals from Experiment 2 were
tested by two experimenters, each of whom baited one of the
two cups. Each experimenter was blind to the quantity of food
items baited into the other’s cup and so was unaware of which
cup contained the larger quantity. This ensured that the human
experimenters could not give subconscious cues to the correct cup
because they did not know which cup was correct. Monkeys were
tested with approximately 55 trials of the number pairs 1 vs. 2
and 2 vs. 9 in the sequential presentation format. Each session was
24 trials. The procedure was otherwise identical to Experiments 1
and 2.
RESULTS
Both monkeys performed significantly above chance from the first
session of testing with the control condition (Binomial tests; Pearl:
19/24, p< 0.01; Ursala: 17/24, p< 0.05). Figure 8A plots the data
in five-trial increments from the beginning of testing and illus-
trates that performance on the control condition was comparable
to performance from Experiments 1 and 2. A t -test comparing
the first 11 blocks of Experiments 1 and 2 with the 11 blocks of
the control condition showed no decrement in performance on
the control condition [Experiments 1 and 2: 61%; Control: 78%;
t (10)= 4.03, p= 0.002]. In fact, performance on the control con-
dition was slightly better overall than performance in Experiments
1 and 2. Figure 8B illustrates that there was no difference in perfor-
mance between the first day of performance on Experiment 1 and
the first day of performance on the control condition. These results
indicate that the baboons’ performance was unaffected when the
human experimenters were unable to provide subconscious cues
to the cup with the larger number. Recall that in this control con-
dition each cup is baited by a different experimenter and neither
experimenter knew the quantity of the other’s cup. The baboons
were able to discriminate quantity despite this modification of the
task procedure, which prevented human cueing.
DISCUSSION
Eight olive baboons without any prior experience discriminating
quantities in experiments were tested on their ability to sponta-
neously discriminate quantities of food items. The monkeys were
able to discriminate small, large, and most importantly, span num-
ber pairs, as evidenced by their ability to choose the larger quantity
at a frequency significantly above chance. The data show that
olive baboons can successfully discriminate quantities, as many
other non-human species are known to do. Our data further
demonstrate that non-human primates spontaneously discrim-
inate quantities using analog quantity representations that are
constrained by ratio and predicted by Weber’s Law.
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FIGURE 8 | Performance on the Control Condition, which controlled for
the possibility of subconscious cueing by experimenters. (A) Performance
on the sequential trials of Experiments 1 and 2 and the Control Condition,
plotted by trial number. Performance on the Control Condition was not
impaired relative to performance on Experiments 1 and 2. (B) A comparison
of performance on the first day of testing for Experiment 1 vs. the first day of
testing on the Control Condition. The data presented from Experiment 1 only
include numerical pairs that are as easy as those from the Control Condition
(numerical ratios ≤0.5). Error bars represent standard error of the mean
difference between monkeys.
We tested hypotheses that address the underlying nature of the
spontaneous quantity representations of non-human primates.
The three hypothetical possibilities we outlined in the Intro-
duction were: (1) object-file numerical representation only, with
success occurring only for small numbers, (2) dual incompati-
ble object-file and analog magnitude representation, with success
occurring for small and large numbers but not span pairs, and (3)
analog magnitude representation only with success dependent on
numerical ratio independently of set size. Reviewing the data, we
find that the performance of these monkeys is best explained by a
single-system analog representation model.
First, monkeys were able to discriminate small, span, and large
number pairs presented simultaneously and small and span pairs
presented sequentially – numerical discriminations which demon-
strably exceed the capacity limit of the object-file system. Failures
on sequential large sets were likely due to attentional constraints
rather than object-file representations because simultaneous and
span discriminations with large values were successful. Anec-
dotally, we observed that baboons were more distractible over
the long sequential trials. This could suggest that failures on
large sequential pairs were due to failures of sustained attention.
Nonetheless, monkeys were capable of accurate discrimination of
span pairs presented sequentially, indicating that they are capa-
ble of representing numbers larger than 3 or 4 during sequential
presentation. Secondly, the finding that baboons successfully dis-
criminated span pairs indicates that monkeys were not simulta-
neously using both the analog and object-file systems to perform
this task as that hypothesis predicts failure on span pairs (but
see Cordes and Brannon, 2008). Finally, monkeys’ performance
was ratio-dependent, the diagnostic signature of analog numer-
ical representations. Together, these strands of evidence support
the conclusion that the analog magnitude system is the dominant
mechanism engaged for spontaneous numerical representation in
baboons.
We also investigated the Weber fractions that characterize the
numerical sensitivity of individual baboons. The Weber fractions
on the first exposure trials were within the range of Weber fractions
previously reported for non-verbal numerical discriminations in
human children (Halberda and Feigenson, 2008). In fact, the spon-
taneous quantity judgments of the olive baboons in this study
are much like that of 3- and 4-year-old human children, both in
terms of discrimination thresholds and in terms of the absence
of a capacity limit in numerical discrimination. Prior studies
have demonstrated that non-verbal numerical performance in 3-
and 4-year-old children also lacks the signatures of “two system”
numerical representation (Halberda and Feigenson, 2008; Cantlon
et al., 2010).
On the longer exposure experiment with two monkeys, overall
performance was significantly above chance for both simultaneous
and sequential set presentations and quantity discriminations were
modulated by ratio. Weber fractions on the longer exposure exper-
iment were similar to those from the first exposure experiment
and so they are also similar to Weber fractions reported for young
children. The baboons did not exhibit substantial improvement
in overall performance over these dozen or so sessions indicating
that learning did not play a major role in baboons’ quantity judg-
ments over across testing. Monkeys’ successful quantity choices
during the control condition provides evidence that monkeys did
not use subconscious cues by human experimenters to solve the
food choice task.
A direct comparison of the baboon data with data previously
reported for human infants (Feigenson et al., 2002; Feigenson and
Carey, 2003, 2005; Le Corre and Carey, 2007) indicates that non-
human primate quantity judgments are not subject to the same
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constraints as those of human infants. The baboons succeeded at
discriminating the numerical pairs that infants have been shown
to fail, even on their first exposure to those pairs. Similarly, in
the longer exposure experiment baboons performed above chance
on numerical pairs that infants fail to discriminate during both
sequential and simultaneous presentation trials. These numerical
pairs are predicted to elicit failure under an object-file hypothesis
due to the capacity limits of the object-file system. Rather than
eliciting an object-file signature, baboons’ performance on these
pairs exhibited the signature of analog magnitude representation
in that performance was modulated by ratio. Again, learning did
not appear to affect judgments on these pairs as there was no evi-
dence of significant improvement over the course of testing on
these specific pairs. Thus, although some researchers have sug-
gested parallels in numerical cognition between human infants
and adult monkeys (e.g., Feigenson et al., 2002), we did not find
support for that hypothesis. In fact, as mentioned above, if any
parallels can be drawn between the numerical abilities of humans
and non-human primates, our data suggest that monkeys might
be more similar to 3- and 4-year-old children, at least in terms
of their discrimination thresholds (i.e., their Weber fractions) and
analog-format numerical representation.
Our results are consistent with prior studies that have argued
for spontaneous analog magnitude numerical judgments in many
animal species (e.g., Meck and Church, 1983; Brannon and Ter-
race, 1998; Cordes et al., 2001; Beran, 2007; Cantlon and Brannon,
2007; see Gallistel, 1990 for review). We obtained similar results
to these prior studies while also filling a gap in the experimen-
tal designs that were used across the studies. In prior studies it
remained unclear whether some design aspect – such as experi-
mental training history – might bias non-humans toward behavior
consistent with the analog magnitude system. As described in the
Introduction, two prior studies reported divergent results: Hauser
et al. (2000) found evidence of the object-file system and Beran
(2007) found evidence of the analog magnitude system. In both
studies, rhesus macaques were presented with two number sets,
presented sequentially and placed into boxes, and subjects were
tested for their ability to choose the box with the larger quantity.
The only difference between those studies was that the Hauser
et al. study tested a real-object food choice task with relatively
experiment-naive subjects, while the Beran study used a joystick
task with experienced subjects. Using a naturalistic food choice
task in which experiment-naive subjects were rewarded with what-
ever amount they chose, we still obtained evidence consistent with
the recruitment of a single analog magnitude numerical system.
The evidence presented here in support of the analog magnitude
system is consistent with the results of Beran (2007) but our exper-
imental design includes important parallels with the design of the
Hauser et al. (2000).
The overall success of these experiment-naive baboons on
quantitative discriminations of food items indicates that non-
human primates spontaneously represent and compare quantities
to make adaptive choices. These discriminations can be made over
simultaneously or sequentially presented sets of items. The dis-
criminations can also be made over small numerical pairs, large
numerical pairs, and pairs that include one small and one large
value. Monkeys’ sensitivity in making these discriminations was
determined by the ratio between the numerical values of the sets,
a signature of analog magnitude representation. The only way to
explain the monkeys’ successful performance in these experiments
is by appealing to spontaneous quantitative abilities. Our data indi-
cate that these spontaneous quantitative abilities in baboons are
inherently analog in nature.
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